Re: Non-PK encryption not vulnerable via low key length?!

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Dear Jake,

> Very true, but note that exhaustive searching of small key spaces (say
> <2^64 keys) is becoming possible on dedicated hardware. Someone (can't
> remember who) proposed a machine for searching the DES keyspace in a few
> _days_, which you could build for about $1M. For what it's worth, $1B would
> buy you a machine to do it in a few hours.

> Anyway, I think we're getting a little bit tangental now...

> Regards,

> Jake.

	That was Michael J. Wiener of Bell Northern Research in 1993.
The paper is 'Efficient DES Key Search'. His proposed machine would have
cost about $1M and would have found a key in about 3.5 hours.

	Shalom,

	JBB.

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